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This paper seeks to determine how high levels of turnover at the apex of the Council of the 
European Union affect the relative strength of ministers and bureaucrats in the Council system. 
We test two rival hypotheses. One hypothesis, based in the general political science literature on 
legislatures, suggests that high rates of turnover will empower bureaucrats. A second hypothesis, 
based on previous studies of ministers and bureaucrats in the Council, implies that high rates of 
turnover will increase uncertainty and drive up ministerial involvement. The paper begins by 
presenting descriptive statistics on ministerial turnover in the Council. It shows that, by any 
metric, rates of Council turnover are very high. We then present statistical models that gauge the 
effects of turnover on the level at which Council decisions are made. We find support for the 
classical comparative hypothesis—higher levels of turnover are associated with lower levels of 
control by nominal principals. This finding generates new insights into Council dynamics and 
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 The Council of the European Union stands at the center of Europe’s decision-making 
process and generally enjoys a dominant position vis-à-vis the European Parliament and the 
European Commission (Thomson 2011). In recent years, steps have been taken to increase the 
transparency of the Council system. Studies have begun to throw light on (a) horizontal patters of 
interaction within the Council (e.g., how member-state representatives relate to and influence 
each other), (b) horizontal patterns of interaction within the broader EU system (e.g., how the 
Council relates to an interacts with the Commission and the EP), and (c) vertical patterns of 
interaction within the Council (e.g., how higher levels of the Council hierarchy relate to and 
interact with lower levels of the Council hierarchy).  
 There is still much to learn, though, about the Council and its dynamics. In comparative 
perspective, it remains a strange institution. The Council carries out both legislative and 
executive functions. Even when the Council is operating in a clearly “legislative” mode (e.g., 
when ministers are sitting around a table, debating a proposal from the Commission or a set of 
amendments from the EP), the principals who are debating have gained their spots at the table, 
not directly, through the ballot box, but by virtue of their respective positions in national 
executive office. While the Council is increasingly portrayed as a kind of upper legislative 
chamber, it is clearly different, in terms of composition and history, than most national senior 
chambers. Upper chambers are usually designed to promote a modicum of stability and 
continuity. The Council, on the other hand, is rather frenetic and protean, at least at its apex. 
Member states operate according to different and generally unpredictable electoral calendars. 
Ministers serve at the discretion of heads of government. Heads of government can fire ministers 
quite easily, and, in some states, individual ministers can be brought down by parliamentary 
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confidence votes. Readers of the Official Journal could be forgiven, in addition, for thinking that 
“the Council,” like other legislatures, consists of a finite number of members that meets, with 
some frequency, in grand plenary. In reality, the Council is divided into sectorally specific 
configurations. Some configurations meet very frequently; others meet only two or three times 
each year. What is more, member states face few legal limits on which specific ministers they 
can send to particular configurational meetings, and the Council has never once met in a grand 
plenary. Finally, ministers’ Council duties are definitionally additional to other official duties; 
those duties are based in and dispatched from national capitals.  
Because of the flux and complexity that constitute the apex of the system, the Council 
depends heavily on its lower levels—on bureaucrats in working groups and permanent 
representatives in senior committees (e.g., the Committee of Permanent Representatives, or 
COREPER). But just how much does the Council depend on these lower levels? Under which 
conditions do bureaucrats in the Council system have real decision-making power? As Häge 
(2007, 2008, 2011a, 2012) has noted, the answers to these questions have important normative 
implications. The Council is often portrayed as a bulwark of national and democratic control. 
Much of the EU system’s input legitimacy rests on the idea that citizens, acting through national 
legislators, can hold ministers accountable for the decisions they make at home and/or in 
Brussels. If bureaucrats decide on the Council’s behalf, however, democratic control is 
weakened. For this reason, it is vitally important to understand the relative power of bureaucrats 
and their ministerial “masters” in the Council and to investigate the conditions that affect the 
vertical articulation of authority within the Council system.  
 This paper tests a theoretical proposition that derives from the general comparative 
politics literature on legislatures. Specifically, we test the notion that legislatures that are 
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characterized by high levels of turnover will heavily rely on bureaucratic staffs. Staffs, in this 
view, are repositories of institutional knowledge, and flux at the level of political principals 
empowers nominally subordinate but actually advantaged agents. We contrast this notion with a 
rival hypothesis that is implied by the more focused work on the Council. Häge (2012), for 
example, suggests that legislative staffs (e.g., Council bureaucrats) are unlikely to make 
decisions when they know little about the preferences of their ministers (and when ministers 
know little about bureaucrats’ preferences); insofar as turnover increases agents’ uncertainty 
about preferences, we would expect high turnover to decrease bureaucratic discretion.  
We test the rival hypotheses by analyzing a new database of ministerial turnover in the 
Council. We begin by discussing our data and demonstrating that very high levels of ministerial 
turnover characterize the Council. Next, we develop the two rival hypotheses in detail. We then 
present a statistical model that seeks to determine whether turnover decreases or increases 
ministerial control in the Council. We find support for the classical comparative hypothesis—
higher levels of turnover are associated with lower levels of control by nominal principals. We 
conclude by discussing the broader implications of this finding and discussing further questions 
and future research trajectories. 
 
Turnover at the apex of the Council system 
 
In most national political systems, ambitious politicians pine for ministerial seats. 
Ministerial office vests incumbents with high visibility and often enables discretion over the 
distribution of influence. But ministerial seats are generally “hotter” than legislative seats; the 
average legislator’s term lasts longer than the average minister’s term. Legislators are often able 
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to rebuild credibility in the interim between a political mistake and the next election. Ministers 
lack such a luxury. Rather, they serve at the mercy of their respective heads of government and 
may be replaced quite easily. This structural situation, in combination with the fact that the 
Council system’s principals are national ministers, suggests that levels of turnover among the 
Council’s principals will be higher than levels of turnover among members of other legislatures. 
But how much higher? Despite the profusion of strong, empirically based studies of the 
Council and the centrality of the notion of turnover in the general literature on legislatures, the 
field is only beginning to address this question (see Scherpereel and Perez, 2014, on which the 
current section is based). To fill the information gap, we have constructed a monthly database of 
EU ministers that stretches from April 2004 (when rules setting up the current system of 
configurations came into operation; see Council Decision 2004/38/EC) through May 2012. Data 
for states that were not EU members on 1 April 2004 begin on the date that those states acceded 
to membership (1 May 2004 for EU-10; 1 January 2007 for Bulgaria and Romania). Data on 
ministers’ names come from the CIA’s monthly Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign 
Governments reports. We code ministers according to sectoral Council configuration. We do not 
consider the General Affairs Council in our calculations, and national ministers whose portfolios 
do not align with any Council configuration are coded as “other” and excluded. Our database 
contains 45,534 rows; each row is dedicated to an individual serving in a position that relates to a 
configuration in a particular month.  
The general comparative literature suggests that the best way to determine turnover rates 
is to compare the composition of a legislature at two points in time, t and t+1, where t is the first 
plenary session after an election and t+1 is the first plenary session after the subsequent election. 
Scholars have used this method to determine turnover rates in national legislatures and in the EP. 
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Observed turnover rates vary across countries, institutions, and temporal periods (see Table 1). 
The average rate of turnover for national legislatures in EU-15 states from 1979-1994 was 33 
percent. The average rate of turnover for the EP between 1979 and 2009 was 44.5 percent.1  
 
- - -  V I E W  T A B L E  O N E  - - - 
 
It is impossible to apply the conventional measurement method to the Council, since the 
Council’s “legislators” are delegates from national governments, and since member states have 
different electoral calendars. Here, however, we outline four alternative ways of measuring 
Council turnover. The observed turnover rate varies, of course, according to the way it is 
defined. Measurements that use shorter temporal periods have lower rates of turnover than 
measurements that use longer temporal periods. By almost any measure or standard of 
comparison, though, rates of Council turnover are strikingly high. 
A first measurement strategy involves borrowing from the broader EU system. Although 
the Council’s session structure differs from the Parliament’s, the five-year term (e.g., 2004-09, 
2009-14) plays a significant role in structuring EU politics. Every five years, EP elections take 
place, and a new Commission takes office. In addition, at least one member state (Luxembourg) 
has a national election cycle that syncs with the EP election cycle, and a number of member 
states have held a national general election on the same day/s as EP elections on a one-off basis. 
Table 2 demonstrates that levels of turnover in the Council are very high within these five-year 
spans. Of the 370 ministers who oversaw Council business at the time of the first post-2004 
election EP plenary, for example, only 26 (7 per cent) remained by the time of the first post-2009 
election EP plenary. Thus, across a five-year span, the Council’s turnover rate was 93 percent. 
                                            
1 EP turnover was calculated using MEPs’ names and dates of service from the European Parliament’s website.  
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Table 2 suggests that specific configurations contributed in relatively proportional fashion to the 
overall trend. The standard deviation among configurations was less than four percentage points; 
no particular configuration was immune to high levels of turnover. 
 
- - -  V I E W  T A B L E  T W O  - - - 
 
Two other measurement options approach the Council on its own terms. In 2006, the 
Council established new working rules (2006/683/EC, Euratom), which sought to promote 
continuity in the institution’s work programme by formalizing coordination among successive 
holders of the Council’s six-month rotating presidency. Practitioners had long opined that the 
six-month presidency, while politically understandable, was practically disastrous. It was very 
difficult for presidency states (particularly small states) to frame priorities and finalize 
negotiations within a six-month term. To address these and related problems, the 2006 rules 
established “trios,” which bring together three successive presidency states. While presidency 
states continue to champion their own causes, they also work with trio partners to produce trio 
work programmes. Thus, while the six-month period remains an important temporal marker of 
the Council’s work, it is worth determining how much turnover takes place within trio periods. 
After all, high levels of personnel churn during these periods could undermine the continuity that 
the trio system has been designed to promote. 
Table 3 presents data on turnover rates within trio periods. In addition to three complete 
periods that have elapsed since January 2007, we report data from a “virtual trio period” (July 
2005-December 2006) that immediately preceded 2007. Table 3 shows that, on average, the 
Council loses half of its legislators over the course of a trio period. This high rate has important 
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implications: even if trio countries cooperate effectively, and even if trio priorities are ably 
communicated at the outset of a trio period, it is likely that half of the principals to whom trio 
priorities are addressed will be absent by the end of the trio period.  
 
- - -  V I E W  T A B L E  T H R E E  - - - 
 
A third measure of Council turnover involves looking at presidencies themselves. 
Traditionally, the six-month rotating presidency has been an important organizing principle for 
Council business. One might expect personnel churn to be relatively minimal within such a short 
span of time. The data, however, suggest otherwise. The figures in Table 4 report averages of 
configuration-specific turnover rates for each presidency period. We began, to clarify what this 
means, by calculating the amount of turnover that took place within the Foreign Affairs Council 
during the Dutch presidency, which took place in the second semester of 2004. This rate (24.6 
percent) was then averaged with the other eight configuration-specific turnover rates for the 
same period. The average configuration lost almost 21 per cent of its incumbents over the course 
of those six months. The overall average rate within a presidency, between 2004 and 2012, is 
17.39 percent: more than one of every six national ministers involved in the conversation at the 
beginning of a presidency will no longer be in the conversation at the end of a presidency. 
 
- - -  V I E W  T A B L E  F O U R  - - - 
 
In addition to the three methods already discussed, we might (finally) measure turnover 
by applying Hibbing’s (1999) average annual measurement. Hibbing suggests that researchers 
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interested in turnover are best served by taking annual stock of the phenomenon. Table 5, which 
considers all configurations together, shows that the Council has an annual average turnover rate 
of 34.92 percent, which contrasts with the national legislative average (9.99 percent) and the EP 
average (8.91 percent) reported in Table 1. Our Council figure may be slightly underestimated; 
individuals who transfer from one configuration to another (as would happen if, say, a person 
serving as education minister in year one was serving as foreign minister in year two) are 
counted as “retained.” Our configuration-specific calculations would count such individuals as 
having left the configuration. 
 
- - -  V I E W  T A B L E  F I V E  - - - 
 
To summarize: on all plausible measures, the Council experiences very high levels of 
turnover. Compared to national legislatures and to the EP, the Council is distinguished by its 
persistent personnel flux.  
 
The effects of high Council turnover: rival hypotheses 
 
There is a significant literature on the implications of personnel turnover in legislatures 
for institutional performance and system legitimacy. On one hand, low levels of turnover are 
normatively problematic, especially (if not exclusively) in democracies; with little elite 
circulation (Pareto, 1961), citizens become alienated from decision-making processes and 
effectively cede political control to an entrenched class of unaccountable rulers (Katz, 1997). In 
addition, systems with very low rates of turnover tend to lock particular groups (e.g., women, 
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minorities, ascendant social classes) out of power. This “lockout” poses a long-term threat to 
system legitimacy and performance (Pareto, 1961; Norris and Lovenduski 1995, p. 197). 
In the current case, though, the question involves the implications of very high turnover 
rates. The literature identifies numerous problems that high turnover can cause. Most of the 
problems are related to the fact that modern governance is a complex process that requires 
interpersonal trust, technical skill, familiarity with written and unwritten rules of the game, and 
deep reserves of institutional memory. It takes time for legislators, no matter how deft they are as 
politicians, to accrue these resources. In Hibbing’s (1991, p. 180) words, “increasing tenure is 
strongly and positively related to legislative activity as well as the legislative specialization and 
efficiency. Tenure in and of itself helps members to be focused and successful legislative 
players.” When legislators come and go with great frequency, they fail to accrue these resources.  
As a result, transient legislators fall prey to more experienced operators elsewhere in the 
governing system – in the executive branch, for example, and/or in legislative chambers with 
lower rates of turnover (Atkinson and Docherty, 1992; Francis and Baker, 1986; Niemi and 
Winsky, 1987; Rosenthal, 1974; Shin and Jackson, 1979). In other words, high turnover 
facilitates the horizontal dispersion of power—the unintentional ceding of power from high-
turnover institutions to more stable institutions. 
Here, however, we are most interested in the implications of turnover for the vertical 
dispersion of power. Generations of political scientists have remarked on the ways that high 
turnover empowers lower, less visible, less accountable layers of the legislative apparatus. These 
theoretical concerns have come out most clearly in debates about legislative term limits (which, 
effectively, are institutional rules designed to promote high turnover). The cosmetic carousel at 
the top of term-limited systems, on this view, generally empowers gray eminences (Rosenthal, 
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1992). Writing against the prospect of term limits in the US Congress, for example, Nelson 
Polsby (1993) wrote: 
 
“So in the end, congressional term limits merely empower lobbyists, congressional staff, 
bureaucrats, presidents, journalists, all those upon whose experience and guidance an 
inexperienced Congress would have to depend. Reducing the strength and the 
competence of Congress reduces the legitimacy of all the acts of government over which 
Congress is entitled to express an opinion. Given the diversity of people that our 
Constitution is required to serve, anything that reduces the legitimacy of our government 
strikes at our capacity to govern ourselves” (Polsby, 1993, p. 101). 
 
Politicians and bureaucrats have also remarked on the ways that turnover caused by term limits 
pushes power “downward” toward legislative staff members and bureaucrats. The first quotation 
below comes from the speaker of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, who is 
speculating about the likely effects of turnover. The second comes from a former politician in 
Maine who was forced from office by a term limit and subsequently took on a senior staff 
position in the chamber where he used to serve:  
 
(1)  
“[Staff members] will be the only institutional memory that’s available, and it will be 
inevitable that [their] influence would rise . . . No matter how honest and bright and hard-
working staff may be, legislators themselves have the primary responsibility, and, 
therefore, I just see this whole areas as really enshrining, if you will, legislative staff to 
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the detriment of the legislature as an institution. They are not subject to the same checks 
and balances and restraints that impose themselves upon [legislators]” (quoted in Carey, 
Niemi and Powell, 2000, p. 80). 
 
(2)  
“I think the fact that you don’t have people who have long tenure and have learned all the 
tricks of the trade means you’re going to have committee chairs that aren’t quite as 
strong. You’re going to have departments and agencies of state government that will be 
able to be more effective in what they want because the chair has less experience . . . To 
be quite frank with you, this position that I hold, in the old days, wouldn’t have been 
participating in some of the meetings that I’ve had to participate in of late, because we 
have leadership that don’t know the ropes, and I have to step in and tell them what the 
tradition is” (quoted in Carey, Niemi, and Powell, 2000, p. 81). 
 
These observations all suggest that while high turnover pushes power “outward,” it also 
pushes power “downward.” In the case of the Council, such downward movement would involve 
increased decision-making activity by working groups and senior committees like COREPER I, 
COREPER II, and the Special Committee on Agriculture (SCA). This intuition supports the first 
hypothesis: 
 
H1: The higher the level of ministerial turnover in the Council, the more likely it is that a 
Council decision will be made by committees. 
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 In terms of microfoundations, H1 makes particular assumptions about relationships 
between European ministers and their bureaucratic deputies in Brussels. EU politics is a 
technical and heavily networked enterprise, and the learning curve for ministers, who are often 
(but not always) accomplished politicians in their home states and often (but not always) relative 
neophytes in the EU, can be significant. Upon entering the Council system, ministers may 
choose to take up issues themselves or to leave negotiations and deal-making to their deputies. 
H1 assumes that configurations with high turnover will have less collective confidence in their 
own mastery of a dossier than they have in their experienced deputies’ mastery of the dossier. 
Thus, they will leave decision-making to the deputies, who themselves tend to have more 
experience in the Quartier Européen.  
 There is an alternative hypothesis, however, which rests upon different suppositions and 
microfoundations. The latter hypothesis draws from the work of Frank Häge, who has studied the 
vertical distribution of power in the Council in great detail without explicitly engaging with the 
possible effects of turnover (e.g., Häge, 2011a; Häge, 2012; Häge and Naurin, 2013). Häge 
(2011a) develops a formal model of bureaucratic motivation that hinges on the notion of 
uncertainty. In this context, “uncertainty” involves bureaucrats’ lack of confidence in the 
position of their respective ministers. According to Häge, bureaucrats in the Council system are 
vertically and narrowly oriented. They are vertically oriented in the sense that they look 
perpetually upward, gauging where their respective ministers stand on the policy dossiers that the 
Council is discussing. They are narrowly oriented in the sense that their upward gaze is restricted 
to their “national silo;” they are not particularly concerned with political developments in other 
member states, and they are not particularly attentive to the question of whether old ministers 
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from other states are exiting or new ministers from other states are entering. They are attuned to 
issues of turnover, but only insofar as turnover takes place within their particular state. 
 Häge’s model assumes, furthermore, that bureaucrats are ultimately concerned with being 
censured or blamed by their respective ministers. A bureaucrat’s decision about how to behave in 
the Council rests on her levels of certainty about the degree of convergence between her sense of 
what her state’s position should be, on one hand, and her minister’s sense of what her state’s 
position should be, on the other. Although Häge does not explicitly discuss the implications of 
turnover for relative levels of uncertainty, it is clear that turnover increases uncertainty. 
Bureaucrats may have developed strong working relationships with previous ministers. When a 
new minister enters office, accumulated understandings between ministers and bureaucrats 
dissipate.  
In this situation, a blame-averse bureaucrat should be more hesitant to commit her state to 
a particular position and more likely to pass decisions up the chain of command. Her fear of 
making the “wrong” decision (and of being censured by the new boss) will encourage her to 
impose the (relatively low) time-cost of referring a dossier upward to the ministerial level.  
It is worth stressing, in this regard, that the same kinds of considerations would affect 
new ministers’ approach to their respective bureaucratic staffs. Upon taking office, new ministers 
may know few of the bureaucrats who are working beneath them. They will lack the stocks of 
trust and/or understanding that accumulate with time and will be more likely, at such moments, 
to decide matters themselves. These considerations lead to a rival second hypothesis: 
 
H2: The higher the level of ministerial turnover in the Council, the less likely it is that a 
Council decision will be made by committees. 
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Data and models 
 
In order to test the rival expectations embodied in these two hypotheses, we develop 
logistic regression models that help predict when ministers will discuss a piece of legislation 
themselves rather than leaving it up to the preparatory committees.  These models use a subset of 
the legislation in Häge’s (2011b) EUPOL dataset, which pulls all legislation and information 
about it from the Commission’s legislative database, PreLex.  PreLex tracks the inter-
institutional decision making process.  The dataset includes information about each step in a 
proposal’s progress through the institutions, including the date, the relevant legal basis, and the 
person or Council configuration that was responsible.  We limit the sample to legislation that was 
adopted using the consultation or codecision procedures and upon which the Council made both 
its first and final decisions between May 1, 2004 and December 31, 2012.  
The dependent variable codes for whether the legislation was discussed as a B point.  B 
points are those that the ministers actually discuss and debate in detail, whereas A points have 
been agreed upon at the bureaucratic level and are approved en bloc at the beginning of 
ministerial meetings. Häge (2012) suggests that there are two potential ways to code proposals. 
One may code whether a proposal was ever, in the course of its progress through the Council, 
discussed as a B point.  Alternatively, one may code whether ministers discussed the proposal as 
a B point during the final negotiations.  Häge prefers the first method, since in some cases the 
“final” decision may simply involve the adoption of properly translated text, rather than the final 
political decision.  For the sake of inclusivity, we test both dependent variables. In the first two 
models, the dependent variable is whether the proposal was ever a B point, while in the second 
two models, the dependent variable is whether the proposal was a B point at its final Council 
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decision.  For all models, we code this variable based on the EUPOL data. The variable is 
dichotomous; it takes a value of  “0” if the proposal does not appear as a B point and “1” if it 
does appear as a B point.  
Our key independent variable is ministerial turnover. To operationalize turnover, we 
incorporate annual turnover within each configuration. The EU’s legislative process is a 
relatively long process; it generally takes proposals more than one year to make it through the 
system. For this reason, we present one model for each dependent variable that uses the turnover 
rate for the date of the first negotiations in the Council on each proposal and a second model that 
uses the turnover rate at the final negotiations. The first rate will impact the earlier stages of the 
decision-making process and has the potential to affect the process throughout.  The final rate 
will be present in the minds of ministers and bureaucrats as they decide who should take the final 
decisions. Our annual turnover rates are measured between May of one year and May of the 
following year. Thus, if the Council’s action occurs between May 1, 2004 and April 30, 2005, 
turnover is operationalized as the amount of turnover that occurred in that configuration between 
those two dates. 
We also include a series of other variables that might affect whether a piece of legislation 
appears before the Council as a B point. These variables are similar to the measures that Häge 
(2012) employs in his model of whether legislation is ever discussed as a B point. The first such 
variable is preference divergence among the member-states. When there is more disagreement 
among national preferences, one would expect the legislation to be dealt with at the ministerial 
level. Häge (2012) uses expert surveys of party positions from one year and links those with the 
relevant ministers in the Council.  However, he does not find this factor to be significant in any 
of his models.   
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We therefore try a different measure, based on information from Thomson et al.’s 
Decision-making in the EU II (DEUII) dataset (Thomson et al., 2012).  The DEUII dataset brings 
together information from interviews with participants in EU policy-making processes, including 
actors from the Council, the European Commission, and the European Parliament. These data 
provide unique information about the various actors’ preferences on particular issues within each 
Council configuration.  Thomson et al. asked the actors to identify controversial issues in 
specific legislative portfolios and then to locate various actors (including each member state’s 
delegation, the Commission, and the Parliament) along a numerical scale between 0 and 100.  
The scale’s poles (0,100) represent extreme views on the issue at hand.  We are therefore able to 
code preference divergence on issues in those pieces of legislation with relatively high precision.   
In order to measure preference divergence for the larger sample of legislation from the 
EUPOL data, we take the mean preference divergence on these issues within each configuration, 
and use that as an indicator of the general divergence for other proposals dealt with by that 
configuration.  While our measure may be more affected by individual proposals than Häge’s 
measure, we believe that it is more representative of the situation “on the ground” in Council 
meetings.  Where proposals are dealt with by multiple configurations, we use the first 
configuration in the models that use the first Council action date and the final configuration in 
the models that use the final date.   
The next variable in our model codes for the level of EP involvement. As Häge (2012) 
argues, further involvement by the European Parliament makes it more difficult for the Council 
to come to an agreement (with which the EP will agree). As a result, increasing amounts of 
legislation are being decided in committees that include representatives from the Parliament. 
Thus, if the EP is given more power, the final Council action on the legislation should be less 
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likely to be a B point. We follow Häge (2012) in coding this as “0” if the proposal was decided 
by the consultation procedure or without amendment under codecision, and as “1” if there were 
amendments under codecision.  
We also include a variable that codes for whether the Council’s voting procedure was 
unanimity or qualified majority voting (QMV). There is a greater likelihood for gridlock and 
disagreement when the rule is unanimity, since discontented member-states may hold out for 
longer than they would under QMV, where they recognize they could be outvoted. Therefore, the 
expectation would be that unanimity makes it less likely that the decision would be a result of 
committee-level decision-making. We code this based on the Monthly Summaries of Council 
Acts, such that unanimous decisions are coded as 1 and QMV decisions as 0. When the 
legislation was not included in the monthly summaries, we used the legal basis of the legislation 
to code the decision-making rule.  
Next, we include a variable to account for possible socialization effects within each 
configuration. The expectation is that committees that meet more often are more likely to have 
internalized various norms, either of a supranational, pro-EU form that might encourage them to 
put European interests above their national interests, or of a committee nature, that encourage 
finding a solution above other considerations (Häge, 2012; Lewis, 2000). Thus, the more often 
the committees meet, the more likely they should be to find solutions at the committee level. 
Similarly, ministers that meet more often may have had a similar type of socialization, although 
presumably to a far lesser extent.  We proxy committee meetings by the number of ministerial 
meetings in each configuration, since the configurations that meet more often are also likely to 
need more preparation work by the relevant committees. We gathered data on the frequency of 
ministerial meetings from the Council minutes.  
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Another expectation is that higher levels of uncertainty about a proposal’s real-world 
effects should increase the likelihood that ministers will want to let committee-level experts 
handle the proposal.  Häge (2012) measures this in two ways. First, he codes whether a 
comitology committee was established. Second, he codes the number of policy areas covered by 
a proposal.  Since he finds the latter to be more significant, we use that measure.  PreLex, via the 
EUPOL data, provides a subject area at each stage of the legislative process, so this variable is a 
count of how many different subjects are listed throughout the process.  
Finally, we include a variable that accounts for how salient a proposal is to member-
states. We expect that ministers will want to be more involved in more salient proposals and that 
committee decision-making will be less likely on highly salient issues.  We follow Häge (2012) 
in coding saliency by the number of recitals in the Commission proposals. Recitals present 
various rationales for the proposal.  More salient proposals are likely to have more reasons for 




Our results, presented in Table 6, suggest that turnover is an important and significant 
predictor of whether decisions are made at the ministerial or committee level. This holds true 
across all of the models; turnover is the only result that is consistent in all four models. The 
relationship supports the first hypothesis, which comes out of the general comparative literature 
on turnover—increased turnover at the ministerial level makes committee-level decisions in the 
Council more likely. Turnover is negative and significant at the .05 level (p = .035) in the first 
model, at the .01 level in the second model (p=.012), and at the .001 level in the third and fourth 
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models (p<.000).  A 1% decrease in the turnover rate increases the odds of a ministerial decision 
by a factor of between 1.8% (model 1) and 5.9% (model 3). When the turnover rate is at its 
observed maximum of 56.25%, the first two models predict that the probability of a ministerial 
decision is only about .25. When the turnover rate it is at its observed minimum, 12.44%, the 
predicted probability is about .47.  For final Council decisions (models 3 and 4), the predicted 
probability shifts from .01 at turnover’s maximum to about .11 at minimum levels of turnover. In 
order to understand the real effect of high turnover in the Council, one can compare the predicted 
probabilities at the average rate of annual turnover for the Council, around 35%, to the average 
rate for the EP and national parliaments, around 9%. Depending on the model, elevated turnover 
in the Council leads to a difference of .095 to .141 in the predicted probability that the ministers 
make the decision themselves. 
 
- - -  V I E W  T A B L E  S I X - - - 
 
The results for the preference divergence variable are counterintuitive. In the first model 
only, this variable is significant at the .05 level (p = .045). The coefficient’s sign is negative, 
suggesting that greater differences among member-state preferences make it less likely that the 
final decision will be made at the ministerial level. A one-point increase in preference divergence 
decreases the odds of a decision being made at ministerial level by a factor of 3.5%. A change 
from the minimum (26.9) to the maximum (41.2) predicts a .11 decrease in the probability of a 
ministerial decision. In the other three models, the preference divergence variable is not 
significant, a finding that aligns with Häge’s (2012) results.  This suggests that ministers may 
actually tend not to make decisions about the most contentious issues.  
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The variable for the Council decision rule (unanimity vs. qualified majority voting) is 
significant only in the fourth model, where the final dates and configurations affect the 
likelihood of final negotiations taking place at the ministerial level (p=.035). Surprisingly, this 
relationship is negative, indicating that when the Council decides by unanimity, the final 
decision is likely to be made at the committee level rather than the ministerial level. This effect is 
relatively small, only changing the predicted probability of a ministerial decision by .025 when 
all other variables are at their mean. 
The involvement of the Parliament and the amount of socialization are both only 
significant (at the .05 level) in the first model. The results for the EP variable are 
counterintuitive, indicating that greater levels of involvement by the EP increase the likelihood 
of decisions being made at the ministerial level.  The effect is not very large, however, increasing 
the predicted probability of a ministerial decision by only .08 (when all other variables are at 
their mean).  The socialization variable is in the expected direction, with more socialization 
(more meetings) decreasing the likelihood of a ministerial decision.  The effect is even smaller 
than that of EP involvement, however, decreasing the predicted probability by only .01.  The fact 
that these variables reach significance only in the first model suggests that they matter more 
earlier in the legislative process.  
Uncertainty, as measured by policy areas, and saliency, as measured by recitals, are both 
significant only for whether proposals are ever discussed as a B point (models 1 and 2), but not 
for whether proposals are discussed as B points in the final negotiations (models 3 and 4).  
Uncertainty has a positive effect, contrary to expectations, and is highly significant (p<.001). 
When a proposal touches on more policy areas, the ministers are more likely to make at least one 
of the decisions themselves.  This effect is quite substantial.  When there is only one policy area, 
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the predicted probability of a ministerial decision is about .3. However, when there are the 
maximum of six policy areas, the predicted probability is almost 1. Saliency has a similarly large 
effect, but in the expected direction. At the lowest number of recitals, when saliency is low, the 
predicted probability of a ministerial decision is about .15.  Proposals with 50 recitals have a 
predicted probability near .9, and those at the maximum of 104 recitals are predicted to be 
decided at the ministerial level with a probability of .9986.  As Häge (2012) has found, saliency 
seems to be a strong and significant predictor of whether ministers become involved in decisions, 




 The results of this study provide substantial insight into the vertical patterns of decision-
making within the Council. The evidence suggests that turnover is an important factor in 
determining where final decisions get made, and that high levels of turnover do increase the 
power of bureaucrats within the Council’s decision-making system. Since the Council is 
generally seen as the most influential of the EU’s three ordinary decision-making institutions, 
this finding has important repercussions for the entire EU system.  
 The implications are particularly important with regard to debates about the democratic 
deficit and the nature of national influence in the EU. Many of the people who participate in the 
Council’s working groups and senior committees have worked in Brussels for relatively long 
periods of time. This experience promotes their socialization into various organizational norms 
(Lewis 2000, 2003). The literature on norms in the Council system cautions against 
oversimplification—experienced bureaucrats are not necessarily unreflective, nation-bashing 
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federalists. Still, such bureaucrats are likely to know the system and their counterparts well, to be 
motivated by a desire to get things done, and to view issues from a different angle than ministers 
with little experience in Brussels and/or the Council system and/or a particular sectoral 
configuration.  
To the extent the bureaucrats are making decisions—and our data suggest that turnover is 
an important factor driving bureaucratic discretion—democratic accountability becomes more 
difficult. Officials are not subject to elections or to significant public scrutiny. A similar 
argument holds for national parliamentary scrutiny of ministerial action in the Council.  While 
democratic advocates have pushed for greater national parliamentary scrutiny and the Lisbon 
Treaty has reflected some of their concerns, MPs hoping to hold their executives (and/or the 
Council as a whole) accountable face a difficult task, indeed. When levels of turnover are high 
and bureaucrats are making more decisions, national parliamentarians have a harder time 
assigning approbation and blame.  
 More broadly, our findings highlight the importance of applying concepts and theories 
from the broader comparative literature to the study of EU institutions. Turnover is an important 
example of such a concept, and it is just one of many that exist. The facts (a) that the 
comparative expectations about turnover contrast with implications coming out of the more 
specific Council literature, and (b) that the current results cut against one of the more specific 





Table 1: Turnover in European National Legislatures 
 









1979-1994 Portugal 5 45.2 19.10 
Spain 4 44.0 12.46 
France 3 42.3 9.85 
Austria 4 38.6 10.29 
Netherlands 5 36.3 10.68 
Greece 6 35.6 13.43 
Italy 4 35.5 8.97 
Luxembourg 4 35.3 7.03 
Finland 4 30.5 9.03 
Belgium 4 28.5 9.45 
Sweden 6 25.4 8.63 
Denmark 6 24.3 10.22 
United Kingdom 4 24.3 5.58 
Ireland 6 23.9 9.30 
West Germany 3 21.3 5.77 
AVERAGE, EU-15 4.5 33.0 9.99 
1979-2009 European Parliament 7 44.5 8.91 
 
Notes and sources: For states with bicameral legislatures, figures cover the lower chamber. For 




Table 2: Turnover in the Council of Ministers, 1 August 2004 – 1 August 2009 
 




# of ministers 





Foreign Affairs 58 4 93.1 
Economic and Financial Affairs 31 4 87.1 
Justice and Home Affairs 52 2 96.2 
Employment, Social Policy, Health, and Cons. Affairs 56 2 96.4 
Competitiveness 33 3 90.9 
Transport, Telecommunications, and Energy 34 1 97.1 
Agriculture and Fisheries 24 1 95.8 
Environment 24 3 87.5 
Education, Youth, Culture, and Sport 58 6 89.7 





Table 3: Turnover Rates Within Trio Periods, July 2005 – June 2011 
 





Foreign Affairs 51.72 
Economic and Financial Affairs 41.94 
Justice and Home Affairs 44.23 
Employment, Social Policy, Health, and Cons. Affairs 45.45 
Competitiveness 45.45 
Transport, Telecommunications, and Energy 45.45 
Agriculture and Fisheries 37.50 
Environment 33.33 





Foreign Affairs 54.69 
Economic and Financial Affairs 57.58 
Justice and Home Affairs 64.81 
Employment, Social Policy, Health, and Cons. Affairs 60.00 
Competitiveness 55.88 
Transport, Telecommunications, and Energy 63.16 
Agriculture and Fisheries 66.67 
Environment 60.00 




Foreign Affairs 61.90 
Economic and Financial Affairs 59.38 
Justice and Home Affairs 48.15 
Employment, Social Policy, Health, and Cons. Affairs 46.77 
Competitiveness 47.06 
Transport, Telecommunications, and Energy 34.29 
Agriculture and Fisheries 44.00 
Environment 56.00 




Foreign Affairs 44.44 
Economic and Financial Affairs 36.36 
Justice and Home Affairs 50.00 
Employment, Social Policy, Health, and Cons. Affairs 49.18 
Competitiveness 50.00 
Transport, Telecommunications, and Energy 47.06 
Agriculture and Fisheries 45.83 
Environment 54.17 
Education, Youth, Culture, and Sport 35.48 
Average (across 4 trios) 49.72 




Table 4: Turnover Rates, Six-Month Rotating Presidencies 
 
Year Semester Presidency Turnover (%), average of 
configuration-specific rates 
2004 2 The Netherlands 20.66 
2005 1 Luxembourg 15.85 
2005 2 United Kingdom 14.05 
2006 1 Austria 16.43 
2006 2 Finland 17.17 
2007 1 Germany 25.41 
2007 2 Portugal 12.95 
2008 1 Slovenia 22.87 
2008 2 France 9.37 
2009 1 Czech Republic 12.95 
2009 2 Sweden 22.22 
2010 1 Spain 12.43 
2010 2 Belgium 25.90 
2011 1 Hungary 11.67 
2011 2 Poland 22.93 





Table 5: Annual Turnover Rates, Council of Ministers, 2004-2012 (%) 
 
 
N 05.2004 05.2005 05.2006 05.2007 05.2008 05.2009 05.2010 05.2011 05.2012 
05.2004 365 0.00 35.07 47.67 70.14 81.10 84.93 87.12 90.14 95.34 
05.2005 364   0.00 20.05 54.40 70.33 76.37 83.79 87.09 92.31 
05.2006 367     0.00 43.87 65.94 72.75 82.29 84.74 90.46 
05.2007 401       0.00 32.67 55.11 70.07 79.55 84.54 
05.2008 396         0.00 31.31 54.29 70.45 80.30 
05.2009 397           0.00 31.99 55.67 76.07 
05.2010 398             0.00 35.43 67.09 
05.2011 387               0.00 49.10 




Table 6: Determinants of Final Council Decision-making 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Ever B Point Ever B Point Final B Point Final B Point 








     
Turnover Rate (at First 
Action) 
-0.0178*  -0.0608***  
(0.00844)  (0.0161)  
Turnover Rate (at Final 
Action) 
 -0.0236**  -0.0552*** 
 (0.00852)  (0.0167) 
Preference Divergence (at 
First Action) 
-0.0361*  -0.0274  
(0.0180)  (0.0396)  
Preference Divergence (at 
Final Action) 
 0.0253  0.0413 
 (0.0161)  (0.0367) 
Unanimity 0.286 0.241 -1.180 -1.325* 
 (0.208) (0.214) (0.623) (0.629) 
Codecision with EP 
Amendment 
0.371* 0.306 -0.672 -0.733 
(0.171) (0.177) (0.398) (0.408) 
Socialization (at First 
Action) 
-0.0551*  0.00885  
(0.0248)  (0.0559)  
Socialization (at Final 
Action) 
 0.0134  0.0266 
 (0.0264)  (0.0608) 
Uncertainty (Policy Areas) 0.996*** 1.203*** -0.488 -0.400 
(0.180) (0.192) (0.512) (0.522) 
Saliency (Recitals) 0.0764*** 0.0809*** 0.00402 0.00414 
(0.00737) (0.00797) (0.0128) (0.0130) 
Constant -0.873 -3.396*** 0.653 -1.973 
 (0.774) (0.748) (1.634) (1.606) 
     
Observations 1,133 1,057 1,121 1,057 
Pseudo R-square 0.198 0.211 0.0685 0.0683 
Wald chi2(7) 288.8 286.2 24.11 22.36 
Prob > chi2 0 0 0.00109 0.00220 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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